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THE EXCLUSIVITY RULE: DUAL CAPACITY
AND THE RECKLESS EMPLOYER
John E. Bohyer
I. INTRODUCTION
Workers' compensation has been, since the early 1900s, a type
of social insurance1 designed to compensate employees who are in-
jured on the job. One author describes the workers' compensation
scheme as "a mechanism for providing cash-wage benefits and
medical care to victims of work-connected injuries, and for placing
the cost of these injuries ultimately on the consumer, through the
medium of insurance, whose premiums are passed on in the cost of
the product." 2
Because workers' compensation is based upon a "no fault"
concept,' it is important to avoid tort concepts. Authorities in the
field agree that one of the major problems in this area of law is the
"importation of tort ideas"' 4 into the scheme. Yet examples abound
of courts injecting tort terms and criteria into workers' compensa-
tion decisions. Indeed, it is nearly impossible to discuss some as-
pects of workers' compensation without also mentioning tort terms
in the same breath.
The advent of workers' compensation gave the employee, who
previously had little hope of compensation for work-related injury,
a system of compensation which did not require him to prove any
fault on behalf of the employer.5 In the same vein, the employer
could no longer avoid payment of compensation by resorting to the
common law defenses of assumption of risk, contributory negli-
gence, or fellow servant to defeat the employee's claim.6 In return
for speedy compensation and the employer's relinquishment of the
above-mentioned defenses, the employee traded the right to sue
the employer for negligence. 7 Indeed, the trade off-nearly guaran-
teed compensation in exchange for employer immunity from
1. Mahlum v. Broeder, 147 Mont. 386, 394, 412 P.2d 572, 576 (1966).
2. 1 A. LARSON, WORKMENS' COMPENSATION § 1.00 (Desk ed. 1984).
3. State ex rel. Morgan v. Industrial Acc. Bd., 130 Mont. 272, 286, 300 P.2d 954, 962
(1956).
4. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, at § 1.20.
5. Morgan, 130 Mont. at 286, 300 P.2d at 962.
6. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3708 (West Supp. 1985); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-42-101
(1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-102 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 616.375(3) (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:15-2 (West 1979).
7. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-411 (1985) provides, in part, that: "For all employments
covered under the Workers' Compensation Act or for which an election has been made for
coverage under this chapter, the provisions of this chapter are exclusive."
1
Bohyer: The Exclusivity Rule: Dual Capacity and the Reckless Employer
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1986
MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
suit-made the system workable. Today, however, social changes
have rendered the workers' compensation system inequitable in
some instances.' This comment examines the "exclusivity" provi-
sions of workers' compensation schemes; it focuses on those in-
stances in which it appears grossly unfair to prohibit the employee
from suing the employer-especially where the employer has ex-
hibited willful, wanton and reckless conduct,9 or where the em-
ployer is acting in a dual capacity. 10
II. EXCLUSIVITY IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Virtually all workers' compensation systems in the United
States contain some type of exclusive remedy provision." That is,
workers' compensation is the only remedy available to the injured
8. Amchan, "Callous Disregard" for Employee Safety: The Exclusivity of the Work-
ers' Compensation Remedy Against Employers, 34 LAB. L.J. 683, 685 (1983). Amchan sug-
gests that
American courts have become increasingly more concerned with personal rights
relative to property rights. Even if the surrender of the common law right to sue
was fair in 1920, the vastly increased change of any plaintiff succeeding in a dam-
age action today warrants a review of the equities of denying an injured worker his
right to sue in all cases. Additionally, other programs such as Social Security and
unemployment insurance have decreased somewhat the benefit gained by the in-
jured workers in this exchange.
9. See, e.g., Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus. Inc., 161 W. Va. 695, 246 S.E.2d 907 (1978).
10. See, e.g., Vesel v. Jardine Mining Co., 110 Mont. 82, 100 P.2d 75 (1940); Bell v.
Industrial Vangas, 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P.2d 266, 179 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1981).
11. ALA. CODE § 25-5-53 (Supp. 1985); ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1985); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23-1022 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1304 (Supp. 1985); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601
(West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-43-104 (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-
284 (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2304 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-304 (1981); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 440.11 (West 1981 & Supp. 1985); GA. CODE § 34-9-11 (Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 386-5 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 72-211 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-6 (Burns Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85-20
(West 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (1981); KEN. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.610 (Baldwin
1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032 (West 1985); MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 28 (1978);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15 (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 24 (West 1976); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 17.237(131) (Callaghan 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.031 (West 1966); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 71-3-9 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.120 (Vernon Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 39-71-411 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-111 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 616.370 (1979);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281:12 (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-1 (West 1959); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 52-1-9 (1978); N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAW § 11 (McKinney Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-10.1 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-08 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.74
(Page 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 12 (West Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.018
(1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 51 (1952); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-29-20 (Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 42-1-540 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-3-2 (1978); TENN CODE
ANN. § 50-6-108 (Supp. 1985); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306(3) (Vernon Supp. 1985);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-60 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 622 (1978); VA. CODE § 65.1-40
(1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.04.010 (Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 23-2-6 (1985); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 102.03(2) (West Supp. 1985); WYo. STAT. § 27-12-103 (Supp. 1983).
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 47 [1986], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol47/iss1/9
1986] EXCLUSIVITY RULE 159
employee, with very few exceptions." The crucial fact in establish-
ing the exclusivity of a compensation claim is determining whether
the employee's injury is one "arising out of and in the course of his
employment."'" The fact that the employee does not make a claim
for compensation will not remove the employer from the exclusive
remedy provision, thereby allowing the employee to sue in tort."
Once a court has determined that an employee's injury is within
the scope of workers' compensation coverage, the chance of the
employee succeeding with a common law action is slim at best.
Montana's exclusive remedy statute is in accord with the vast
majority of states. Section 39-71-411 of Montana Code Annotated
provides in part that: "[Ain employer is not subject to any liability
whatever for the death of or personal injury to an employee cov-
ered by the Workers' Compensation Act. . . . The Workers' Com-
pensation Act binds the employee himself, and in case of death
binds his personal representative and all persons having any right
or claim to compensation for his injury or death . ". .. ,5 Since the
adoption of the statute, the Montana Supreme Court has many
times held that the Montana Workers' Compensation Act provides
the exclusive remedy for employees injured on the job.' 6 The few
instances in which the employer is removed from the exclusivity
provision will be discussed more fully later.
While exclusivity statutes generally prohibit the initiation of
tort actions for injuries sustained on the job, most workers' com-
12. The exceptions include the dual capacity doctrine, injuries sustained as a result of
reckless employer conduct, and intentional torts committed by the employer. See, e.g.,
Vesel, 110 Mont. 82, 100 P.2d 75; Mandolidis, 161 W. Va. 695, 246 S.E.2d 907; Great W.
Sugar Co. v. District Court, 188 Mont. 1, 7, 610 P.2d 717, 720 (1980).
13. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-407 (1985) provides:
Every insurer is liable for the payment of compensation, in the manner and to the
extent hereinafter provided, to an employee of an employer it insures who receives
an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, or in the case of his
death from such injury, to his beneficiaries, if any.
14. See Sedore v. Sayre, 119 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1953).
15. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-411 (1985).
16. See generally Noonan v. Spring Creek Forest Prod., Inc., - Mont. __, 700
P.2d 623 (1985) (the employer's knowledge of a hazardous machine will not remove the
employer from the protection of the exclusive remedy statute); Iverson v. Argonaut Ins. Co.,
198 Mont. 340, 645 P.2d 1366 (1982) (the compensation rights of relatives and dependents
of a deceased employee are those provided by workers' compensation); Great W. Sugar Co.,
188 Mont. 1, 610 P.2d 717 (unless the employee alleges intentional tort, the employer is
immune from suit); Brown v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 167 Mont. 418, 539 P.2d 374 (1975) (as-
saults on an employee by a supervisor do not act to remove the employer's shield against
tort actions); Carlson v. Anaconda Co., 165 Mont. 413, 529 P.2d 356 (1974) (even though the
employer does not pay the benefits provided by the Act, the employee's sole remedy is with
the Workers' Compensation Division); Enberg v. Anaconda Co., 158 Mont. 135, 489 P.2d
1036 (1971) (the employer's immunity from suit remains despite employer violation of
safety statutes); Wirta v. North Butte Mining Co., 64 Mont. 279, 210 P. 332 (1922).
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pensation schemes fail to compensate the employee for the entire
amount of damages suffered. 17 The employee is instead compen-
sated for medical and rehabilitation costs, together with a percent-
age of the salary lost due to the accident.' 8 Thus, while employer
tort immunity is the quid pro quo which employees have ex-
changed for statutorily-guaranteed compensation, evidence sug-
gests that many injured employees suffer adverse financial effects
because of the limited scope of workers' compensation benefits."
In addition to the often minimal compensation injured em-
ployees receive, there are frequent time delays in payment due to
administrative problems and disagreement between the employer
and employee as to the injury's compensability. In fact, in one
Montana case the injured employee was without compensation for
a period of seven years following the accident.2 0
Another problem which hampers the current workers' compen-
sation system arises because the employer often bears an insignifi-
cant portion of the cost of an employee's injury." A system which
allows the employee to sue in tort, in some cases, would shift the
cost more directly to the employer. The employer would either
make the workplace more safe or, in the alternative, would suffer
the effects of tort actions. As one author has observed:
It would be nice to think that employers are impelled by humane
motives to consider the health and safety of their employees as
the paramount concern. But the unfortunate truth is that busi-
ness reacts best to hopes of profit maximization. Where some em-
ployers can avoid more costly protections for their employees
without incurring additional liability, they usually will do so."
17. Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers' Compensa-
tion Statutes, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1641, 1652 (1983).
18. Id. at 1642. See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-705 to -743 (1985).
19. Note, supra note 17, at 1643 n.16. See also Samers and Kelly, Promptness of Pay-
ment in Workers' Compensation, 1 RESEARCH REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL WORK-
ERS' COMPENSATION TASK FORCE 63, 75-76, stating that the wages lost due to industrial in-
jury were replaced at the rate of 42%; and that one-half to three quarters of those surveyed
could not maintain their pre-injury standard of living.
20. Conway v. Blackfeet Indian Developers, - Mont. - , 669 P.2d 225 (1983).
While not advocating the allowance of tort actions by injured employees, the Montana Su-
preme Court did express outrage over the time delay, saying: "[a]lthough some inherent
institutional delay may be expected as a claim lumbers through the process, it is clear as
day that a 7-year case time is intolerable to a worker. .... If this case does not shake some
legislator's conscience, perhaps nothing will."
21. Ashford and Johnson, Negligence v. No-Fault Liability: An Analysis of the Work-
ers' Compensation Example, 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 725, 759-60 (1982), where the authors
note that even under the most efficient compensation systems the employer bears less than
9% of the employee's wage loss.
22. Schroeder, Workers' Compensation: Expanding the Intentional Tort Exception
to Include Willful, Wanton, and Reckless Employer Misconduct, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
[Vol. 47
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This does not suggest that the business community as a whole
lacks concern for the safety of employees. Rather, it suggests that,
currently, a significant portion of the burden of compensating the
employee is often not borne by the responsible party, i.e., the em-
ployer. The inability of the insurer to recover from the employer
by way of contribution or indemnity further illustrates the sys-
tem's inefficiency.23 Generally, the employer's sole liability, irre-
spective of the employer's conduct or the gravity of injury to the
employee, is an increased insurance premium. 24 While insurance
premiums in some industries have skyrocketed, previously cited
cases indicate that rising insurance rates alone have not decreased
reckless employer conduct.2 5
With exclusivity provisions in workers' compensation law, the
system neither provides sufficient compensation for injured em-
ployees2" nor encourages employers to operate safer workplaces. As
long as the employer continues to bear an insignificant portion of
workplace injury costs, the workers' compensation system will con-
tinue to operate inefficiently.
The counterargument posited by supporters of the current
system maintains that, despite the inefficiency of the system in
terms of allocating costs, workers' compensation was never in-
tended to fully compensate injured workers.27 If this be the case,
then the employee should be allowed to seek an alternative remedy
to the extent the system fails to compensate his injury. In cases of
reckless employer conduct, as well as dual capacity, it is imperative
to the well being of the injured worker that he be allowed to seek
full compensation for his injuries by means of a common law
action.
III. DuAL CAPACITY DOCTRINE
The dual capacity doctrine, one exception to the exclusivity
890, 895 n.30 (1983).
23. See, e.g., Cordier v. Stetson-Ross, Inc., 184 Mont. 502, 508, 604 P.2d 86, 89 (1979),
where the court said, "[iut is our opinion that the broad provisions of § 39-71-411 MCA
require us to hold that the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act are exclusive as to
the liability of the employer for damages sustained by the injured employee whether they
are sought by the employee directly, or by a third party under contribution."
24. See, e.g., Vesel, 110 Mont. 82, 100 P.2d 75; Mandolidis, 161 W. Va. 695, 246 S.E.2d
907.
25. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 16.
26. Samers and Kelly, supra note 19, at 75-76.
27. Note, supra note 17, at 1648. See also Epstein, The Historical Origins and Eco-
nomic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775, 800 (1982) (the author
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rule, holds that "an employer normally shielded from tort liability
by the exclusive remedy principle may become liable in tort to his
own employee if he occupies, in addition to his capacity as em-
ployer, a second capacity that confers upon him obligations inde-
pendent of those imposed ofn him as employer."2 8 One of the first
cases supporting the dual capacity doctrine, Duprey v. Shane," in-
volved a woman who injured her back and neck while on the job at
a chiropractic clinic. Following her injury, Duprey sought treat-
ment from her employer, Dr. Shane, a chiropractor. The treatment
administered by her employer only aggravated her initial injuries.
Mrs. Duprey instituted a tort action against Dr. Shane, alleging
that she was further disabled by her employer's negligent adminis-
tration of chiropractic treatment. Dr. Shane argued that, since the
injury arose in the course and scope of employment, Duprey's ex-
clusive remedy was through the workers' compensation system.
The California Supreme Court disagreed with the defendant's
assertion that the injuries arose in the course and scope of employ-
ment. Instead, the court held that "when the employing doctor
elected to treat the industrial injury, the doctor assumed the same
responsibilities that any doctor would have assumed had he been
called in on the case."30
The court predicated its holding on the dual capacity doc-
trine-that a doctor in such a case is a "person other than the
employer.""1 More precisely, Dr. Shane acted outside the scope of
the employer-employee relationship and was instead acting as the
plaintiff's doctor. Where the employer bears two legal relationships
to the employee, the dual capacity doctrine controls, and the in-
jured employee will be allowed to recover a workers' compensation
claim, as well as pursue a common law action, notwithstanding the
exclusivity rule.32
The dual capacity doctrine is often pleaded in cases involving
negligent medical treatment,3 as well as in products liability
28. 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 72.80, at 14-112 (1976).
See generally Comment, The Dual Capacity Doctrine: Piercing the Exclusive Remedy of
Workers' Compensation, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 1013 (1982).
29. 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).
30. Id. at -, 249 P.2d at 13.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. See, e.g., Vesel, 110 Mont. 82, 100 P.2d 75. See also REV. CODES MONT. § 2839
(1935), which provided in part: "In the event said employee shall prosecute an action for
damages for or on account of such injuries so received, he shall not be deprived of his right
to receive compensation but such compensation shall be received by him in addition to and
independent of his right to bring action for such damages . . ."
33. See generally Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 1066 (1969) (addressing the employee's right to
maintain a malpractice action for negligent medical care notwithstanding workers' compen-
[Vol. 47
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cases. 34 Though the dual capacity doctrine effectuates a substantial
advantage for the employee in terms of receiving full compensation
for sustained injuries, it is supported in only a few jurisdictions.3 5
Courts most often reject the doctrine because they find it contrary
to the social philosophy behind workers' compensation.3
The Montana Supreme Court adopted the dual capacity doc-
trine in Vesel v. Jardine Mining Co.37 Vesel, employed in defen-
dant's mine, was struck in the eye by a steel fragment which sepa-
rated from plaintiff's drill. He sought the aid of the company
foreman who, on behalf of the defendant, "voluntarily and gratui-
tously assumed to render medical aid and attention to [Vesel]. 38
The foreman took Vesel to Mrs. Davison for treatment. Mrs.
Davison had no medical qualifications and because of her negli-
gence, Vesel lost the sight in his injured eye.
The court outlined the kinds of acts which will remove the
employer from the protection of the exclusive remedy statute. In-
deed, "[i]t was never intended or contemplated that an employer
could hide behind the Compensation Act and thereby escape liabil-
ity from his negligent or malicious acts towards an employee for an
act having no connection with the course of employment."3
Since Vesel, the Montana Supreme Court has not addressed
the dual capacity doctrine. It is somewhat ironic, however, that the
Montana Supreme Court recognizes the minority rule and allows
tort actions under the dual capacity doctrine, but refuses to allow
sation coverage). See also Wright v. District Court, - Colo. -, 661 P.2d 1167 (1983);
Vesel, 110 Mont. 82, 100 P.2d 75; Wimer v. Miller, 235 Or. 25, 383 P.2d 1005 (1963).
34. See generally Annot., 9 A.L.R.4th 873 (1981). See also Bell, 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637
P.2d 266, 179 Cal. Rptr. 30; Moreno v. Leslie's Pool Mart, 110 Cal. App. 3d 179, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 147 (1980); Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797
(1977); Panagos, 35 Mich. App. 554, 192 N.W.2d 542; Tatrai, 439 A.2d 1162. Cases rejecting
the doctrine include Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 499, 125 Cal. Rptr. 872
(1975); McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor, 85 Ill. 2d 352, 423 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Needham v.
Fred's Frozen Foods, Inc., 171 Ind. App. 671, 359 N.E.2d 544 (1977); Peoples v. Chrysler
Corp., 98 Mich. App. 277, 296 N.W.2d 237 (1980); Billy v. Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp.,
51 N.Y.2d 152, 412 N.E.2d 934, 432 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1980). It is crucial to note that California
has by statute limited application of the dual capacity doctrine. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602
(West Supp. 1985).
35. See, e.g., Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 77 Ill. 2d 313, 396 N.E.2d 524
(1979); Panagos v. North Detroit Gen. Hosp., 35 Mich. App. 554, 192 N.W.2d 542 (1971);
Vesel, 110 Mont. 82, 100 P.2d 75; Volk v. City of New York, 284 N.Y. 279, 30 N.E.2d 596
(1940); Guy v. Arthur H. Thomas Co., 55 Ohio St. 2d 183, 378 N.E.2d 488 (1978).
36. See generally Annot., 23 A.L.R.4th 1151, 1155 (1983) (examining the dual capacity
doctrine as a basis for tort recovery).
37. 110 Mont. 82, 100 P.2d 75 (1940).
38. Id. at 84, 100 P.2d at 76. While the facts of the case do not establish that the
woman who treated plaintiff was an employee of defendant, the court obviously deemed the
relationship close enough to attribute the woman's negligent medical care to the employer.
39. Id. at 99, 100 P.2d at 83 (emphasis added).
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common law actions for injuries sustained as a result of willful,
wanton, or reckless employer conduct.40
Courts which accept the dual capacity doctrine in products lia-
bility cases are quick to point out that the employer has a second
capacity as a manufacturer out of which legal obligations arise. For
instance, in Bell v. Industrial Vangas,4" the court analyzed
whether the product which injured the employee was sold to the
general public rather than used solely for the employer's busi-
ness.42 The reasoning applied by the court is clear: The employer,
who also occupies the role of manufacturer, has a duty to his em-
ployees who use the product in their work, as much as to the pub-
lic which buys the product for its own use, to insure that manufac-
tured products are safe for use. Injuries sustained by the employee
due to a defective product will not insulate the employer from a
products liability action.4 3 Because only a few states recognize the
dual capacity doctrine,44 allowing employees to pursue common
law actions in products liability cases will do much to force the
employer to operate a safer workplace. Furthermore, the employer
will bear a greater portion of the cost of employee injuries caused
by defective products,45 thereby facilitating more equitable com-
pensation for the employee.
If workers' compensation truly forces industry to absorb the
cost of employment-related injuries,46 then those responsible for
compensating injured workers surely must desire to maintain a
safe workplace to minimize payments to injured workers. But, in
most states the employer who assumes a dual capacity bears an
insignificant portion of the cost of the injury and may render negli-
gent medical care or manufacture defective products without fear
of financial retribution. This makes little social or economic sense
because employees continue to be subjected to such conduct, and
the insurance industry, together with the general public, continues
to bear the cost of employers' actions.
Opponents of the dual capacity doctrine argue fervently that
40. Compare Vesel, 110 Mont. 82, 100 P.2d 75 with Noonan , Mont. -, 700
P.2d 623.
41. 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P.2d 266, 179 Cal. Rptr. 30.
42. Id. at 278, 637 P.2d at 272, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
43. Id.
44. See generally cases cited, supra note 32.
45. Ashford and Johnson, supra note 21, at 759-60.
46. See McCormick, 85 Ill. 2d 352, 356, 423 N.E.2d 876, 877, where the court said "the
design underlying the Act was that the cost of industrial injuries should be borne by indus-
try and not by the injured employee or by the general public." However, the court refused
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workers' compensation should, under all circumstances, provide
speedy and almost-guaranteed compensation in return for em-
ployer tort immunity. For example, one court has stated that,
in the field of workers' compensation law, and in suits by a
worker against his employer, the initial injury is the cause of all
that follows, even where there is superimposed upon the original
injury, a new, or additional or independent injury during the
course of the [medical] treatment, negligent or otherwise. 7
This reasoning, taken to the extreme, implies that the em-
ployer who, in treating the employee's injury amputates the leg in
an effort to stop the toe from bleeding, is nevertheless absolved of
any tort liability. Acceptance of this reasoning does nothing to fos-
ter the operation of a safe workplace. On the contrary, by refusing
to allow tort claims under the auspices of the dual capacity doc-
trine, the majority of states are encouraging activity which breeds
unsafe workplaces.48
Moreover, opponents of the dual capacity doctrine argue that
allowance of independent tort actions would disrupt the balance
between workers and employers. As Justice Richardson stated in
his dissent in Bell v. Industrial Vangas,49
this delicate balance, carefully conceived and preserved . . . is
significantly altered and disturbed when we hold that each of the
thousands of employers in this state engaged in manufacturing
for ultimate sale to the public loses the statutory immunity to
any employee who is injured by defects in the goods or products
manufactured.50
The California Legislature obviously agreed with Justice Richard-
son since, in 1982, it restricted application of the dual capacity
doctrine.51
Because courts and legislatures have failed to carve out lim-
ited exceptions to the exclusivity rule, employers continue to oper-
ate unsafe workplaces. Unless they face adverse financial effects,
many employers will remain unwilling to create safe working envi-
ronments.52 Expansion of exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule
will likely result in an increase of employee tort actions, but this
alone does not warrant continuance of the status quo. The "flood-
gate of litigation" argument which various courts have alluded to
47. McAlister v. Methodist Hospital, 550 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tenn. 1977).
48. See, e.g., McCormick, 85 Ill. 2d 352, 423 N.E.2d 876.
49. 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P.2d 266, 179 Cal. Rptr. 30.
50. Id. at 288-89, 637 P.2d at 279, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
51. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West Supp. 1985).
52. See Schroeder, supra note 22, and accompanying text.
9
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simply does not address the inequities of the present system.5 3
Without the dual capacity doctrine,
the prevailing authority allows employers to get away with the
most "callous disregard" of their employees' safety and health. It
also forces employees to look for someone else to sue, usually a
manufacturer, even when it is the employer who is most responsi-
ble (or totally responsible) for his or her injuries. Employers sim-
ply do not have the same economic incentives to protect the
physical safety of their employees that, for example, manufactur-
ers have to protect consumers who use their products. 4
McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor,55 illustrates this lack of ec-
onomic incentive. In McCormick, an employee injured on the job
was treated by a doctor employed by the defendant at its in-house
clinic. 56 The Illinois Supreme Court dismissed the employee's suit
against his employer for providing negligent medical care, and re-
jected application of the dual capacity doctrine." This decision
forced McCormick to accept a workers' compensation award for his
injuries, and the employer was absolved of liability since, as the
court noted, the employer was merely complying with the law.5"
The effect of McCormick and similar decisions is that employ-
ers who provide in-house medical treatment, be it correctly or neg-
ligently administered, will be immune from common law actions.
More importantly, employers will have virtually no incentive to
provide adequate medical care in employer-operated medical
facilities.5 9
In essence, refusal to adopt the dual capacity doctrine as an
exception to the exclusivity rule exacerbates one of the primary
problems inherent in the workers' compensation system: inade-
quate compensation for the injured worker.6 0 By refusing to allow
employees to sue their employers in tort,
the present system permits employers to impose obviously dan-
gerous working conditions on employees-at workers' compensa-
53. 30 Cal. 3d at 288, 637 P.2d at 278, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 42, where the dissent argued
that expansion of the dual capacity doctrine would ultimately include the employer as land-
owner or cafeteria proprietor. See also Noonan, __ Mont. __, 700 P.2d 623, 626 (Morri-
son, J., concurring).
54. Amchan, supra note 8, at 693.
55. 85 Ill. 2d 352, 423 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
56. Id. at 354-55, 423 N.E.2d at 877.
57. Id. at 360, 423 N.E.2d at 879.
58. Id. at 357-58, 423 N.E.2d at 878.
59. See, e.g., Note, The Illinois Workers' Compensation Act and the Dual Capacity
Doctrine-McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 31 DEPAUL L. REv. 607, 621 (1982).
60. Note, supra note 17, at 1643 n.16.
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tion's relatively reduced level of recovery-because the employee
frequently cannot prove an employer's specific intent to cause
harm. This result offends the dual policy of the workers' compen-
sation system-to encourage a safe workplace while providing ad-
equate compensation for certain injuries."
IV. INTENTIONAL TORT AND WILLFUL, WANTON AND RECKLESS
CONDUCT
While workers' compensation is an injured employee's sole
remedy in nearly all cases, courts are unanimous in allowing the
injured worker to sue the employer when such injury is the result
of the employer's commission of an intentional tort.62 Most often
the employee sues the employer because of a physical beating the
employee has suffered from either the employer63 or one of his co-
employees.6 The crux of the issue in cases of physical battery is
whether the employer commits the tort or whether the tort is a
supervisory employee's act. 5 The employee will likely be allowed
recovery if he sustains a beating at the hands of the employer, but
in cases involving co-employee batteries, courts will probably dis-
miss the case as to the employer.6 '
The question that arises in cases of alleged intentional miscon-
duct is whether the conduct is "intentional." Courts frequently
struggle with this issue, employing terms ranging from merely neg-
ligent, negligent, and grossly negligent, to culpable negligence, will-
ful, wanton and reckless misconduct, and intentional misconduct.6 7
The attorney's task of deciphering what these terms mean is a for-
61. Schroeder, supra note 22, at 890.
62. See, e.g., Noonan,__ Mont. __, 700 P.2d 623 (1985), and Great W. Sugar Co.,
188 Mont. 1, 7, 610 P.2d 717, 720 (1980), where the court said: "Itihe 'intentional harm'
which removes an employer from the protection of the exclusivity clause of the Workers'
Compensation Act is such harm as it [sic] maliciously and specifically directed at an em-
ployee, or class of employee out of which such specific intentional harm the employee re-
ceives injuries as a proximate result."
63. See generally Annot., 96 A.L.R. 1064 (1979) (analysis of what employer conduct is
intentional so as to permit maintenance of a tort action by the employee). See also Brown v.
Stauffer Chem. Co., 167 Mont. 418, 539 P.2d 374 (1975); McGrew v. Consolidated Freight-
ways, Inc., 141 Mont. 350 (1963); Readinger v. Gottschall, 201 Pa. Super. 134, 191 A.2d 694
(1963).
64. See Note, Massey v. Selensky: Workers' Compensation and Coemployee Immu-
nity in Montana, 46 MONT. L. REV. 217 (1985).
65. See, e.g., Jablonski v. Multack, 63 IIl. App. 3d 908, 380 N.E.2d 924 (1978); Mc-
Grew, 141 Mont. 324, 377 P.2d 350.
66. Jablonski, 63 Ill. App. 3d 908, 380 N.E.2d 924; McGrew, 141 Mont. 324, 377 P.2d
350.
67. See generally cases cited, supra note 16. See also Ulicny v. National Dust Collec-
tor Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1265, 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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midable one.
In the typical business atmosphere, the employer should not
be held liable for the intentional torts of a foreman or supervisor.6 s
The employer simply may not know of and cannot control the em-
ployee's tortious acts. But, the higher up the employment ladder
the injuring employee sits, the more likely it is the employer will
he beld liable for tortious acts of the supervisory employee.
A different situation arises, however, when the employer goes
beyond simple negligence to the point of willful, wanton, and reck-
less conduct. Such conduct is not "intentional" in the true sense of
the word.6 9 However, reckless conduct is not comparable to negli-
gence either. In fact, negligence implies accidental or inadvertent,
whereas recklessness envisions knowledge on the actor's part that
certain consequences are probable.
As one court observed near the turn of the century, willful and
reckless conduct must be viewed as "much more than mere negli-
gence, or even gross or culpable negligence, and as involving con-
duct of a quasi-criminal nature, the intentional doing of something
either with the knowledge that it is likely to result in serious injury
or with a wanton and reckless disregard of its probable conse-
quence." 0 Moreover, workers' compensation is designed to replace
tort actions only with respect to negligently-caused accidents.71
"Entrepreneurs were not given the right to carry on their en-
terprises without any regard to the life and limb of the partici-
pants in the endeavor and free from all common law liability."7 2
Allowing an employer to be immune from tort liability in the face
of reckless conduct does not promote a safe workplace. Instead,
this permits an employer to commit reckless acts free from repri-
sal, knowing the only financial retribution will be increased insur-
ance premiums.
Reckless employer conduct does not in any manner comport
with the purposes of workers' compensation, yet courts in nearly
all jurisdictions have ruled against employees who sue their em-
68. See, e.g., Jablonski, 63 Ill. App. 3d 908, 308 N.E.2d 924; McGrew, 141 Mont. 324,
377 P.2d 350. The courts alluded that where the person who inflicts the injuries is the alter
ego of the employer, a common law action against the employer becomes more plausible.
69. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 727 (5th ed. 1979) defines "intention" as the "determina-
tion to act in a certain way to do a certain thing. Meaning; will; purpose; design." In addi-
tion, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) uses intent to illustrate the actor's
desire to cause the consequences of his act, or that the actor believes the consequences are
substantially certain to result from the act.
70. In re Burns, 218 Mass. 8, 10, 105 N.E. 601, 602 (1914).
71. Mandolidis, 161 W. Va. 695, 700, 246 S.E.2d 907, 911.
72. Id. at 705, 246 S.E.2d at 913.
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ployer for injuries sustained by reckless employer conducts.7
Courts instead have required employees to seek their remedy
through workers' compensation. 4 While the employee attempting
to prove reckless conduct would have a difficult burden of proof, he
should not be prohibited from pursuing such an action merely be-
cause the defendant happens to be the employer.
The court in Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc.,7 ruled ex-
actly opposite the majority of courts, saying:
Wilfulness or wantonness imports premeditation or knowledge
and consciousness that injury is likely to result from the act done
or the omission to act. Wilful, malicious, or intentional miscon-
duct is not, properly speaking, within the meaning of the term
"negligence." Negligence and wilfulness are mutually exclusive
terms which imply radically different mental states. "Negligence"
conveys the idea of inadvertence as distinguished from premedi-
tation or formed intention. An act into which knowledge or dan-
ger and wilfulness enter is not negligence of any degree, but is
wilful misconduct. 76
In Mandolidis, three actions were consolidated on appeal. The first
involved an employee who sustained injuries when his hand came
in contact with a ten-inch table saw which was not equipped with a
safety guard;77 the second concerned a worker who died when a
platform spanning an excavation at a bridge construction site col-
lapsed; 78 and the third involved an employee crushed to death by
falling slate in a coal mine.7 9
The Mandolidis court stated that, "[t]he conduct removing
the immunity bar must be undertaken with a knowledge and an
appreciation of the high degree of risk of physical harm to another
created thereby."80 Consequently, evidence of willful, wanton, and
reckless conduct precludes a finding of accidental injury. If the in-
73. See generally cases cited, supra note 16. See also Fryman v. Electric Stream Radi-
ator Corp. 277 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1955); Suk Hwan Chung v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 276 Or. 809, 556
P.2d 683 (1976); Higley v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 13 Wash. App. 269, 534 P.2d 596 (1975).
74. Compare Noonan,__ Mont. - , 600 P.2d 623; and Enberg, 158 Mont. 135, 489
P.2d 1036 (the court stated that without an intentional tort, the employee's sole remedy is
workers' compensation benefits); with Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chem., Inc., 69
Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982); and Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F.
Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
75. 161 W. Va. 695, 246 S.E.2d 907.
76. Id. at 705, 246 S.E.2d at 914.
77. Id. at 707, 246 S.E.2d at 914-15.
78. Id. at 710-12, 246 S.E.2d at 916-17.
79. Id. at 716-17, 246 S.E.2d at 919-20.
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jury is not accidental, it is outside the scope of workers' compensa-
tion coverage and the employee will be allowed to initiate a tort
action. A 1983 amendment to the West Virginia Code limited the
holding of Mandolidis; the employee may now sue only when the
employer acts with "deliberate intention.""'
By setting an extremely high standard for maintenance of
common law actions, the court in Mandolidis achieved two impor-
tant goals. First, it insured that only employers whose conduct
goes beyond negligence to the point of willful, wanton, and reckless
conduct will be removed from the exclusivity provision and sub-
jected to tort liability. This, hopefully, will act as an incentive for
the reckless employer-the employer who acts knowing the proba-
ble result will be employee injury-to maintain a safe working
environment.
Second, the Mandolidis decision maintained the integrity and
fundamental fairness of the legal system. If we recognize that one
of the purposes of workers' compensation is to provide a type of
social insurance for those unfortunate enough to be injured on the
job due to unforeseen accidents,8 2 we should also be willing to rec-
ognize that equating reckless employer conduct with accidental in-
jury is absurd. Negligence implies accidental or inadvertent,
whereas willful, wanton, or reckless conduct envisions knowledge
by the employer of danger to employees. The employee whose inju-
ries are the result of reckless employer conduct should not be pre-
cluded from seeking full compensation merely because the defen-
dant is also the employer. 83
Some states have addressed the problem of the reckless em-
ployer escaping tort liability by enacting legislation which grants
the employee a penalty award when the employer's conduct cannot
be characterized as ordinary negligence.8 4 The Montana Legisla-
ture has not enacted a penalty provision which would provide an
additional award to the injured employee if the injury results from
willful employer misconduct or from the employer's removal of a
safety device required by law. In any case, while the concept is
good, the average penalty award8 5 often is not enough incentive for
81. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1985).
82. See, e.g., Mahlum v. Broeder, 147 Mont. 386, 394, 412 P.2d 572, 576 (1966).
83. Bell, 30 Cal. 3d at 279, 637 P.2d at 273, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
84. Schroeder, supra note 21, at 90. See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1310 (1981); CAL.
LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.165 (Baldwin 1981); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 287.120 (Vernon 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-10 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-
12 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-12 (1974); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.57 (West Supp. 1985).
85. See generally statutes cited, supra note 93. The penalty awards average 10% of
the award to the injured employee.
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the reckless employer to maintain a safe work environment.
V. WILLFUL, WANTON, OR RECKLESS EMPLOYER CONDUCT IN
MONTANA
The Mandolidis decision presents a persuasive argument for
allowing an injured employee to initiate a tort action where the
employer exhibits reckless conduct. However, the Montana Su-
preme Court has not been receptive to such an interpretation of
workers' compensation law. In fact, in Montana, with the exception
of intentional torts and injuries occurring under the dual capacity
doctrine, "an employer is not subject to any liability whatever for
the death of or personal injury to an employee covered by the
Workers' Compensation Act . , "86
The Montana Supreme Court has addressed the issue of
whether to impose tort liability upon the willful, wanton, or reck-
less employer and has refused to allow the injured employee to
maintain a tort action.8 7 In Enberg v. Anaconda Co.,88 the plaintiff
instituted a tort action to recover for the death of her husband.
The decedent died in a mine explosion which occurred after sev-
eral fires in defendant's mines. 9 Even though the plaintiff alleged
the employer had (1) violated state safety statutes regarding the
storage of explosives in mines, (2) breached its own safety regula-
tion, and (3) continued blasting operations despite serious and
ongoing mine fires, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of the suit, holding that plaintiff's sole remedy
was by way of workers' compensation.9
Quoting Larson, the court said:
[W]hat is being tested here is not the degree of gravity or deprav-
ity of the employer's conduct but rather the narrow issue of in-
tentional versus accidental quality of the precise event producing
injury. The intentional removal of a safety device or toleration of
a dangerous condition may or may not set the stage for an acci-
dental injury later. But in any normal use of the words, it cannot
be said, if such an injury does happen, that this was deliberate
infliction of harm comparable to an intentional left jab to the
chin.9'
The court's reliance on Larson's analogy to the left jab totally ne-
86. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-411 (1985).
87. See cases cited, supra note 16.
88. 158 Mont. 135, 489 P.2d 1036.
89. Id. at 136, 489 P.2d at 1036.
90. Id. at 138, 489 P.2d at 1037.
91. Id. at 137, 489 P.2d at 1037. See also LARSON, supra note 27, at § 68.13.
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glected the issue of whether the Workers' Compensation Act 92
should cover injuries occasioned by the employer's willful, wanton,
or reckless conduct. The court's failure to recognize the distinction
between negligence and reckless conduct93 only harms those whom
the Workers' Compensation Act is intended to protect, namely, the
employees. The court's decision in Enberg that the decedent's
death was "accidental" 94 is plainly incorrect. Accident, in the con-
text of workers' compensation, is defined as "an event that takes
place without one's foresight or expectation; an undesigned, sud-
den and unexpected event. 95
The Workers' Compensation Act is to be liberally construed96
"in order that the humane purposes of the legislation shall not be
defeated by narrow and technical construction, and the intention
of such requirement is for the benefit and protection of the in-
jured workman and his beneficiaries.9 7 However, "liberal con-
struction is no justification for disregarding plain statutory provi-
sions. "98 The Montana Supreme Court must strike some type of
balance between liberal construction and plain statutory meaning.
On this basis, it becomes evident that the Montana Workers' Com-
pensation Act does not envision coverage of injuries caused by
reckless employer conduct.
Montana law specifically provides that, to be covered by the
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, the injury sustained
must be "a tangible happening of a traumatic nature from an un-
expected cause or unusual strain."99 Liberal construction is one
thing, but to equate "unexpected" and "unusual" with reckless
conduct completely disregards the plain statutory provision of the
Act. Moreover, one must remember that the liberal construction is
92. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-71-101 to -2909 (1985).
93. See, e.g., In re Burns, 218 Mass. 8, 10, 105 N.E. 601, 602 (1914), where the court
said, in contradistinction to mere negligence, reckless conduct is of a "quasi-criminal nature,
the intentional doing of something either with the knowledge that it is likely to result in
serious injury or with a wanton and reckless disregard of its probable consequence." But see
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 931 (5th ed. 1979), where it is said that negligence "refers only to
that legal delinquency which results whenever a man fails to exhibit the care which he ought
to exhibit, whether it be slight, ordinary, or great, It is characterized chiefly by inadvertence,
thoughtlessness, inattention, and the like, while 'wantonness' or 'recklessness' is character-
ized by willfulness."
94. 158 Mont. at 137, 489 P.2d at 1037.
95. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 15 (5th ed. 1979).
96. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-104 (1985).
97. McCoy v. Mike Horse Mining & Milling Co., 126 Mont. 435, 440, 252 P.2d 1036,
1039 (1953) (emphasis added).
98. State ex rel. Magelo v. Industrical Acc. Bd., 102 Mont. 455, 462, 59 P.2d 785, 789
(1936).
99. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119 (1985) (emphasis added).
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to be in the employee's favor. In spite of any expansive meaning
the Montana Supreme Court may give to the words "unexpected"
and "unusual," "there must be a limit on what the employee must
tolerate." 100
While the majority of states do not allow employee tort ac-
tions against the employer, 101 these same states and a number of
commentators agree that a compensable injury under workers'
compensation law is one which results from an "accident," "unex-
pected cause," or "fortuitous event." 102 In Montana, for example,
the Legislature in 1915 stated that a compensable injury encom-
passed "only an injury resulting from some fortuitous event."10 3
Clearly, a fortuitous event or unexpected cause comports with the
meaning of accident; reckless conduct does not. By definition it is
evident that at its inception in Montana and, undoubtedly, in
other states as well, workers' compensation was designed to pro-
vide coverage for industrial accidents and not willful, wanton, or
reckless conduct.
The situation, unfortunately, has not changed in Montana.
The supreme court in Great Western Sugar Co. v. District
Court,104 another case involving alleged reckless employer conduct,
denied the injured worker the opportunity to seek a tort remedy
against the employer.
While allowance of tort actions against the reckless employer
is admittedly a minority rule, a few jurisdictions have changed this
dismal situation.105 The law has slowly evolved in this arena. As a
result, many workers faced with futures destroyed by industrial in-
juries are forced to bear a large portion of the cost of their injuries,
albeit with the assistance of workers' compensation benefits, de-
spite the fact that they are unable to recover damages from the
100. Noonan, - Mont. __, 700 P.2d at 628 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
101. See statutes cited, supra note 11.
102. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(2)
(1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-1 (West 1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-19 (1978); N.Y. WORK.
COMP. LAW § 2(7) (McKinney 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(7) (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 85, § 3(7) (Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.005(8)(a) (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-160
(1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-102(4) (Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-44(5) (1974);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 601(11)(A) (1978); VA. CODE § 65.1-7 (1980); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
102.01(2)(c) (West Supp. 1985). See also N. GROSFIELD, MONTANA WORKERS' COMPENSATION
MANUAL § 3.10 (1979).
103. 1915 Mont. Laws ch. 96, § 6.
104. 188 Mont. 1, 610 P.2d 717. There the plaintiff sustained permanent damages
when his foot was struck by a truck's winggate. The plaintiff alleged the employer had
knowledge of previous injuries caused by the same piece of equipment and that the em-
ployer knew of the dangers of the equipment.
105. See. e.g., Neal, 548 F. Supp. 357; Blankenship, 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d
572; Mandolidis, 161 W. Va. 695, 246 S.E.2d 907.
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reckless employer.
Most recently, in Noonan v. Spring Creek Forest Products,
Inc.,'06 the Montana Supreme Court maintained its position. The
plaintiff, employed by a small lumber concern as a wood planer
operator, fed rough lumber through the planer to insure proper
size.10 7 While operating the planer one morning, the plaintiff
placed his hand into the machine to dislodge a piece of lumber.'05
Noonan received serious injuries which caused permanent damage
to his arm.10 9
The plaintiff alleged numerous facts to support his claim
based upon reckless employer conduct,"0 and yet the court refused
to adopt the minority rule, saying, "[w]here an employee's allega-
tions go no further than to charge an employer with knowledge of a
hazardous machine, the complaint does not state a cause outside
the purview of our exclusive remedy statute.""' Just as it had
done previously in Enberg"2 and Great Western Sugar Co.,113 the
court refused to address the crucial issue of whether the Montana
Workers' Compensation Act envisions coverage of employee inju-
ries which are not the result of simple negligence, but rather will-
ful, wanton, or reckless conduct-conduct which borders on inten-
tional tort."'
Workers' compensation is not intended to cover injuries other
than those caused by industrial accidents.' 5 Consequently, refusal
by courts to allow injured workers to maintain common law actions
against their employers for the employer's willful, wanton, or reck-
less conduct flies in the face of the overall spirit of the Workers'
Compensation Act. Injuries caused by recklessness are simply not
comparable to injuries which are the result of accidents. Such a
comparison is in fact one of apples and oranges.
VI. CONCLUSION
Workers' compensation today plays an important role in soci-
106. - Mont. -, 700 P.2d 623.
107. Id. at __, 700 P.2d at 624.
108. Id.
109. Id. at -, 700 P.2d at 627 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at , 700 P.2d at 624. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500,
comment a and special note (1965).
111. Id. at -, 700 P.2d at 625-26.
112. 158 Mont. 135, 489 P.2d 1036.
113. 188 Mont. 1, 610 P.2d 717.
114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
115. See, e.g., Mandolidis, 161 W. Va. 695, 700, 246 S.E.2d 907, 911. See also statutes
cited, supra note 111.
[Vol. 47
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 47 [1986], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol47/iss1/9
EXCLUSIVITY RULE
ety. Yet, most actors in the system are dissatisfied with workers'
compensation as a whole. Employees argue that they receive inade-
quate compensation for their injuries, and insurance carriers feel
as though their only role is to sign the check every time an em-
ployee is injured. Rather than require courts to stretch the law to
find a compensable injury,' it may be more appropriate to change
the system. Indeed, the line drawing that courts have done in find-
ing compensability of work-related injuries has only exacerbated
the problem of inefficient compensation.
One possible solution may be to require employee contribution
to the cost of maintaining workers' compensation insurance. In ex-
change for employee contribution, employers would no longer be
immune from suit in instances of reckless employer conduct. Em-
ployee contribution would clearly reduce the employer's out-of-
pocket insurance expenses. Moreover, allowance of common law
actions would encourage employers to maintain a safer work envi-
ronment; and it would also take some of the financial burden off
the insurance industry. Such a plan would undoubtedly be con-
fronted with problems, but the present system must be realigned if
workers' compensation is to remain a viable mechanism for solu-
tion of work-related injury claims.
Workers' compensation was initiated to compensate negli-
gently caused injuries. The original systems did not envision al-
lowing employers to exhibit reckless conduct with impunity. To do
so would be a complete mockery of our legal system. Yet, most
jurisdictions are unwilling to alter the traditional system, which al-
lows reckless employers to escape serious liability. And while the
reckless employer who exhibits recklessness or willful misconduct
is shielded from tort liability, the employee is often precluded from
receiving workers' compensation benefits when he has committed
willful misconduct. 17 Legislatures and courts should immediately
address the inequity that the exclusivity rule presents. Failure to
do so may result in the slow dissolution of the workers' compensa-
tion system.
116. See, e.g., Conway, - Mont. -, 669 P.2d 225 (1983).
117. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600(d)-(g) (1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-284(a)
(1972); IDAHO CODE § 72-208 (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.16 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-
101 (1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281.15 (1978).
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